judaxis

Sentinel · Private staging · Verified snapshot

A real model plan, bounded before effect.

A pinned local generative model produced a signed, fixed-action plan. Judaxis treated that output as untrusted data, then ran the verified plan through an isolated agent in a KVM-backed Kata guest. The independent gateway permitted one bounded synthetic action and denied a policy-mutation attempt before it reached the secret broker or target service.

VERIFIED SNAPSHOT 2026-10-16T19:32:31.589Z

What ran

  • Pinned Qwen model in a network-isolated local container
  • Signed, fixed-enum action plan
  • KVM-backed Kata agent workload
  • Independent gateway, OpenBao broker and target

Observed result

  • Allowed action executed exactly once
  • Policy mutation denied before broker access
  • Denied action produced no target effect
  • Raw secret was neither returned nor retained

Model-to-effect boundary

  • Model output was never executed directly
  • No generated code entered the runtime
  • Only two predeclared action identifiers were accepted
  • The plan signature was checked against an external trust key
Model
qwen2.5-coder:1.5b-instruct-q4_K_M · d7372fd82851
Plan SHA-256
a1685d8a6981b7b23e87899ae80851b0b4db628f94e347fa773198552b94d29d

Exposure controls

  • Kubernetes API blocked externally
  • OpenBao blocked externally
  • Application services remained ClusterIP-only
  • No administrative port-forward remained

Supply-chain state

  • One immutable OCI image digest
  • No mutable runtime image tag
  • No source-code ConfigMap mounts
  • CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM produced

Evidence identity

The source evidence passed Ed25519 signature verification against a separately supplied staging trust anchor before this sanitized summary was built.

Evidence SHA-256
f01c4bdcd7f8a931808a2bc1a1f8e96a0825c5c02e26a9f58f37952ffe2e781b
Image
sha256:d8cd2956fdaf30d05c620533cfa77549fd977c786245fe1df2bf628f0fd264a0
Trust scope
ephemeral staging

What this proves

For this tested plan, a real model-selected request could not bypass the deterministic gateway. The denied mutation reached neither the secret broker nor the target, while the allowed action produced one measured effect.

Not yet proven

  • Production high availability
  • External penetration testing
  • Customer production workloads
  • KMS/HSM-backed signing
  • Online model execution inside the KVM guest
  • External frontier-model integration
  • Prevention of arbitrary agent behavior
Precise claim boundary

The real model generated the bounded plan in a separate network-isolated local container; it did not run inside the KVM guest. This is a time-bound, synthetic staging result. It demonstrates live runtime interposition for the tested actions, not a certification, a zero-risk claim or proof that every autonomous behavior can be stopped.

Machine-readable public summary

The allowlisted summary excludes server addresses, guest identifiers, credentials, audit contents and customer data. Inspect the JSON summary.